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l BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
1 Appellate Court No. 910489 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a Final Order of the District Court 
for the First Judicial District of the State of Utah, in and for 
the County of Cache. Since the instant case does not involve any 
of the types of decisions by a district court which give the Court 
of Appeals jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3 Utah Code Ann. 
(1953), the Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction in accordance 
with § 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
2 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Does Utah permit parties to a private contract having 
substantial contacts with Utah to provide that venue may be in a 
state other than Utah? 
Does Utah permit parties to a private contract having such 
substantial contacts with Utah that venue would otherwise lie in 
courts of Utah to provide that venue may only be in courts of a 
state other than Utah? 
Did the forum-selection clause in the Master License and 
Marketing Agreement between Lundahl Instruments, Inc. and Safety 
Technology, Inc. limit venue for a suit based on nonpayment by 
Safety Technology for units ordered from and provided by Lundahl 
Instruments exclusively to courts in the State of California? 
The standard for review concerning each of these issues is 
correctness of the trial court's ruling. See Mountain Fuel Supply 
ye Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988) and Scharf v. BMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1970 (Utah 1985). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are subject to 
interpretation by this Court: 
§ 78-13-9, Utah Code Annotated (1953): 
The court may, on motion, change the place of trial 
in the following cases: 
(1) when the county designated in the complaint is 
not the proper county. 
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(2) when there is reason to believe that an 
impartial trial cannot be had in the county, city, or 
precinct designated in the complaint. 
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends 
of justice would be promoted by the change. 
(4) when all the parties to an action, by 
stipulation or by consent in open court entered in the 
minutes, agree that the place of trial may be changed to 
another county. Thereupon the court must order the 
change as agreed upon. 
§ 78-13-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended* 
When the defendant has signed a contract in the 
state to perform an obligation
 t an action on the 
contract may be commenced and tried in the following 
venues: 
(1) If the action is to enforce an interest in 
real property securing a consumer's obligation, the 
action may be brought only in the county where the real 
property is located or where the defendant resides. 
(2) An action to enforce an interest other than 
under Subsection (1) may be brought in the county where 
such obligation is to be performed, the contract was 
signed, or in which the defendant resides. 
§ 78-13-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953): 
In all other cases the action must be tried in the 
county in which the cause of action arises, or in the 
county in which any defendant resides at the 
commencement of the actioni pro\ided, that if any such 
defendant is a corporation, any county in which such 
corporation has its principal office or place of 
business shall be deemed the county in which such 
corporation resides within the meaning of this section. 
If none of the defendants resides in this state, such 
action may be commenced and tried in any county which 
the plaintiff may designate in his complaint; and if the 
defendant is about to depart from the state, such action 
may be tried in any county where any of the parties 
resides or service is had, subject, however, to the 
power of the court to change the place of trial as 
provided by law. 
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Article VIII, Section 5, Constitution of Utah, prior to 1985 
repeals 
The state shall be divided into seven judicial 
districts, for each of which, at least one judge shall 
be selected as hereinbefore provided. Until otherwise 
provided by law, a district court at the county seat of 
each county shall be held at least four times a year. 
All civil and criminal business arising in any county, 
must be tried in such county, unless a change of venue 
be taken, in such cases as may be provided by law. Each 
judge of a district court shall be at least twenty-five 
years of age, an active member of the bar in good 
standing, learned in the law, a resident of the state of 
Utah three years next preceding his selection, and shall 
reside in the district for which he shall be selected. 
Any district judge may hold a district court in any 
county at the request of the judge of the district, and, 
upon a request of the governor it shall be his duty to 
do so. Any cause in the district court may be tried by 
a judge pro tempore, who must be a member of the bar, 
sworn to try the cause, and agreed upon by the parties, 
or their attorneys of record. (As amended November 7, 
1944, effective January 1, 1945.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE AND COURSE OF THE CASE 
Lundahl Instruments, Inc., Plaintiff and Appellant (a Utah 
corporation), brought the instant action against Safety 
Technology, Inc., Defendant and Appellee (a California 
corporation), to recover the price for goods delivered to Safety 
Technology. An agreement between the two corporations, which 
Lundahl Instruments argues was terminated in February, 1991, 
contained a forum-selection clause. Because of the clause, the 
trial court granted Safety Technology's Motion To Dismiss on 
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September 30 , 1991 (Record at 53-55). And Lundahl Instruments, 
consequently, filed the instant appeal. 
STATEMENTS OF FACT 
Lundahl Instruments, Incc, Plaintiff and Appellant (a Utah 
corporation), and Safety Technology, Inc., Defendant and Appellee 
(a California corporation), voluntarily, knowingly, and at arm's 
length executed a Master License and Marketing Agreement dated 
April 21, 1989. (Record at 53.) 
This Agreement provided that Lundahl Instruments would 
develop an ultrasonic sensing system and would sell such system to 
Safety Technology, which was given an exclusive license to market 
and sell the system and was obligated to use its best efforts to 
do so. (The information in the preceding sentence is, because of 
the early dismissal of this case, not in the record; it is 
provided here simply to give the Court background data and not as 
a basis for decision.) 
The Agreement was - except for minor details - negotiated by 
both parties in Utah. Lundahl Instruments signed the Agreement in 
Utah; Safety Technology executed the Agreement in California. 
(Record at 45.) 
The ultrasonic sensing system was developed and manufactured 
in Utah. (Record at 46.) 
Safety Technology ordered a number of units of the ultrasonic 
sensing systems from Lundahl Instruments, which accepted such 
orders at its place of business in Cache County by sending such 
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units and executing invoices therefor between August 16, 1990, and 
April 26, 1991. (Record at 2, 6-21, 46.) 
Safety Technology was to send payment for the units to Cache 
County, Utah. (Record at 46.) The total principal amount owed 
was $38,185.72. On October 1, 1990, Safety Technology paid 
$1,684.00; on April 23, 1991, $1,064.00. Safety Technology made 
no further payment, leaving a principal balance of $35,437.72. 
(Record at 2, 6-19.) 
Terms on the invoices obligated Safety Technology to pay 
interest at the rate of one and one-half percent (1.5%) per month 
on all accounts over thirty (30) days old and to pay Lundahl 
Instruments any collection costs or expenses involved in 
collecting a past due account, including reasonable attorney's 
fees. (Record at 2, 6-19, especially 19.) 
For units Safety Technology had ordered and received prior to 
those discussed above, Safety Technology owed Lundahl Instruments, 
as of June 22, 1990, interest in the amount of $10,895.32. 
(Record at 3, 21.) 
The units were sent by Lundahl Instruments from Cache County, 
Utah, on a common carrier to Safety Technology in California. 
(Record at 46.) 
Lundahl Instruments has maintained in Cache County, Utah, the 
documentation demonstrating the ordering of the units, the 
acceptance of those orders, shipping of the units, invoicing for 
these shipments, and Safety Technology's nonpayment. (Record at 
46.) 
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The Agreement contains a clause which says, in pertinent 
parts 
Yenue for any litigation arising out of this 
Agreement, or in connection with the transactions 
contemplated hereby, shall lie in any federal or state 
court sitting in Defendant's state, with proper 
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. Therefor, 
if Lundahl were to commence an action against STI, 
jurisdiction would be in California; if STI were to file 
an action against Lundahl, jurisdiction would be in 
Utah. 
(Record at 54.) 
Lundahl Instruments filed the instant action on June 6, 1991; 
and the District Court dismissed the action on September 30, 1991, 
based upon Section 78-13-4 Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended. 
(Record at 1, 53-55.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Opinions of the United States Supreme Court concerning 
contractual stipulations for venue, i.e.., forum-selection clauses, 
are by their own terms limited to diversity cases and admiralty 
cases, where federal law governs the enforceability of the 
clauses. This leaves each state with the freedom to develop its 
own policy. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that it should not 
permit venue to be changed unless the Utah Legislature has 
provided therefor. And the relevant statutes permit a change of 
venue only from one county in Utah to another county in Utah. 
Moreover, even if the decisions by the United States Supreme Court 
were applicable, the policy expressed by the Utah statutes 
8 
concerning venue would preclude enforcement of the instant forum-
selection clause. 
But, in any event, the language in the instant clause merely 
purported to allow venue in another state, not to deprive the Utah 
courts of venue. 
And termination of the underlying agreement ended any effect 
which the forum-selection clause would otherwise have had over an 
action to recover from Safety Technology the price for goods 
ordered from and shipped by Lundahl Instruments. 
ARGUMENT 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS NOT ISSUED 
A CONTROLLING OPINION CONCERNING CONTRACTUAL 
STIPULATIONS FOR VENUE. 
Three (3) decisions have been issued by the United States 
Supreme Court concerning contractual stipulations for venue: M/S 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Stewart 
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988); and 
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. , 113 L.Ed. 2d 
622 (1991). 
Although these decisions upheld the enforceability of the 
specific forum-selection clauses in question, they are 
inapplicable to the instant situation. Bremen and Carnival Cruise 
Lines were based upon admiralty law, and Stewart Organization was 
a federal diversity case where "... federal law, specifically 28 
U.S.Cc § 1404(a), governs the District Court's decision whether to 
give effect to the parties' forum-selection clause . . . " 487 
9 
U.S. 22, 32 (1988) . Similarly, in Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 D.S. 
, 113 L.Ed 2d 622, 629 (1991), the Court had said, "We begin 
by noting the boundaries of our inquiry. First, this is a case in 
admiralty, and federal law governs the enforceability of the 
forum-selection clause we scrutinize. 
And in Bremen, 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) the Court observed, 
"Forum-selection clauses have historically not been favored by 
American courts. Many courts, federal and state, have declined to 
enforce such clauses on the ground that they were "contrary to 
public policy,' or that their effect was to 'oust the 
jurisdiction" of the court." In footnote 10, the Court then gave 
examples of such rulings. The Court did, though, in footnote 11, 
provide citations to cases which advanced the view " . . . that 
such clauses are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless 
enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' 
under the circumstances." 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972). And the Court 
announced that it believed " . . . this is the correct doctrine to 
be followed by federal district courts sitting in admiraltyc" 407 
U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (emphasis added). 
The crucial point, however, is that the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that each state is entitled to develop its 
own policy concerning the enforceability of contractual 
stipulations concerning venue. 
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THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ENFORCE A FGRUM-SELECTXGN 
CLAUSE PROVIDING FOR VENUE IN ANOTHER STATE 
WHEN VENUE WOULD OTHERWISE BE PROPER IN UTAH 
UNTIL THE LEGISLATURE OF UTAH HAS EXPLICITLY 
PROVIDED THEREFOR* 
In State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775, 111 (Utah 1977), the 
Supreme Court of Utah quoted from the then existing version of 
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution: 
. . . All civil and criminal business arising in any 
county, must be tried in such county, unless a change of 
venue be taken, in such cases as may be provided by law. 
The Court continued by explaining that White v. Rio Grande 
Western Rv, Co. , 25 Utah 346, 71 P. 593 (1903), had " . . . pointed 
out that the Constitution merely recognizes the existing common-
law doctrine of venue and intends to prohibit a change of venue 
except when authorized by law". 
Thus, this Court has recognized that it should not enforce a 
forum-selection clause providing for venue in another state when 
venue would otherwise be proper in Utah unless the Legislature of 
Utah has explicitly provided therefor. And the Legislature has 
not done so. 
In pertinent part, § 78-13-9 Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
provides, "The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in 
the following cases . . . (4) when all the parties to an action, 
by stipulation or by consent in open court entered in the minutes, 
agree that the place of trial may be changed to another county. 
Thereupon the court must order the change as agreed upon." 
It seems apparent that "stipulation" in this section means a 
written agreement entered by the parties after the commencement of 
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litigation and that "another county'* means another county within 
the State of Utah* Despite the fact that a highly strained 
interpretation could find that the section permits pre-litigation 
contractual stipulations to compel a change of venue to a county 
in another state , it seems extremely unlikely that the Legislature 
would allow the courts of this state to be deprived of the ability 
to adjudicate cases affecting the citizens of this state without 
clearly and explicitly so stating. 
Until April 23, 1990, the relevant statutory directive on 
venue concerning written contracts, Utah Code Annotated § 78-13-4, 
reads 
When the defendant has contracted in writing to perform 
an obligation in a particular county of the state and 
resides in another county, an action on such contract 
obligation may be commenced and tried in the county 
where such obligation is to be performed or in which the 
defendant resides. 
Understandably but unfortunately, this is the version of 
S 78-13-4 which the trial court erroneously concluded to be 
currently in force and to control the enforceability of the forum 
-selection clause in question. (Record at 54.) 
The trial court gave no indication that venue should be 
determined by the statutes concerning venue that were in effect 
when an agreement containing a forum-selection clause was signed. 
It seems more likely that the trial court implicitly recognized 
that venue is properly governed by statutes in effect at the time 
litigation is commenced but inadvertently quoted a superseded 
version of the relevant statutec 
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Presently § 78-13-4 provides in pertinent parts 
When the defendant has signed a contract in the state to 
perform an obligation, an action on the contract. . . 
may be brought in the county where such obligation is to 
be performed, the contract was signed, or in which the 
defendant resides. 
Since the Defendant in the instant case signed the agreement 
under consideration, i.e., the Master License and Marketing 
Agreement in California (Record at 43.), the permissive provisions 
of § 78-13-4 are inapplicable; and the controlling directive is 
the mandatory strictures of § 78-13-7 Utah Code Annotated (1953): 
In all other cases the action must be tried in the 
county in which the cause of action arises, or in the 
county in which any defendant resides at the 
commencement of the action; provided, that if any such 
defendant is a corporation, any county in which such 
corporation has its principal office or place of 
business shall be deemed the county in which such 
corporation resides within the meaning of this section. 
If none of the defendants resides in this state, such 
action may be commenced and tried in any county which 
the plaintiff may designate in his complaint. . . . 
(emphasis added) 
Although Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution was 
amended in 1985 and no longer contains the explicit language 
concerning venue that was quoted supra, it is instructive that 
§ 78-13-7 Utah Code Annotated (1953) was enacted under such 
Constitutional language and that there is no indication of an 
intent to alter the rule that venue may be changed from the court 
where common law would place it only when a statute authorizes 
such change* 
The final sentence in the quotation from § 78-13-7 lends 
additional credence to the argument that the term "county" as used 
in the Utah statutes concerning venue means county within the 
State of Utah. Certainly it would be neither logical nor 
Constitutional to permit a plaintiff to bring suit in any county 
of the United States (or another country) simply because none of 
the defendants resides in Utah. 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Lundahl Instruments, Inc., properly 
followed the guidance of § 78-13-7 and commenced its action in 
Cache County because Defendant and Appellee, Safety Technology, 
Inc., is a corporate resident of California (Record at 1.) and the 
cause of action arose in Cache County in that Defendant and 
Appellee, Safety Technology, failed to send payment for the goods 
it received from Plaintiff and Appellant, Lundahl Instruments, and 
such payment was to have been sent to Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Lundahl Instruments, in Cache County. (Record at 44.) 
The Supreme Court of Idaho in McCarthy v. Herrick, 240 P. 
192, 193 (Idaho 1925), considered whether a contractual provision 
for venue could displace a statutory directive which utilized 
mandatory language similar to that of Utah Code Annotated § 78-13-
7 and declared? 
To thus authorize the commencement and maintenance of an 
action in any other county than that fixed by statute is 
not a proper subject of contract. 
Recently, in Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Eneroywave Corp., 773 P.2d 
1143 (Idaho 1989), the Supreme Court of Idaho was required to 
apply Florida law to determine the validity of a forum-selection 
clause. The Idaho Supreme Court determined that Florida had 
chosen to adopt the reasoning from M/S Bremen v* Zapata Off-Shore 
COce, supra, which Florida viewed as imposing three conditions 
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that must exist in order for a forum-selection clause to be 
enforceable: 
1 . The forum was not chosen because of 
overwhelming bargaining powers on the part of one party 
which would constitute overreaching at the other's 
expense * 
2. Enforcement would not contravene a strong 
policy.enunciated by statute or judicial fiat, either in 
the forum where the suit would be brought, or the forum 
from which the suit has been excluded. 
3. The purpose was not to transfer an essentially 
local dispute to a remote and alien forum in order to 
seriously inconvenience one or both or the parties. 
Cerami-Kote, supra at 1146, quoting Maritime Limited Partnership 
v. Greenman Advertising Associates, Inc., 455 So.2d 1121 (Fla. 
App. 4th Dist. 1984) (emphasis in Idaho opinion but not in Florida 
decision). The Supreme Court of Idaho then found that the 
requisite "strong policy enunciated by statute" was provided by 
I.C. § 29-110: 
Limitations on rights to sue. - Every stipulation 
or condition in a contract by which any party thereto is 
restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract 
by the usual proceedings in the original tribunals, or 
which limits the time within which he may thus enforce 
his rights, is void. 
Cerami-Kote^ supra at 1146 (emphasis in original). 
Since this Idaho statute is only slightly more explicit than 
§ 78-13-7 Utah Code Annotated (1953), the policy enunciated in 
§ 78-13-7 that the action must be tried in the county in which the 
cause of action arises; or, if none of the defendants resides in 
Utah, in any county the plaintiff designates would - even if the 
Bremen analysis were applicable - demonstrate that the instant 
forum-selection clause should not be enforced. 
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In the only case where the Supreme Court of Utah has 
considered this conflict between statute and contract, i...e.. , 
Petersen v. Qgden Union Railway and Depot Co»f 175 P.2d 744, 747 
(Utah 1946), the Court ruled: M. * . venue is a privilege which 
may be waived, but it may not be contracted away in the face of a 
specific statute which prohibits such contracting, as does Section 
5 of the Employer's Liability Act, . ." 
EVEN IF ENFORCEMENT OF A FORUM-SELECTION 
CLAUSE IS PROPER, SUCH CLAUSE SHOULD NOT BE 
READ AS A MANDATORY DIRECTIVE UNLESS SUCH 
CLAUSE EXPLICITLY SO PROVIDES. 
Even were it appropriate to enforce the instant forum-
selection clause, the language of such clause is merely 
permissive. 
Venue for any litigation arising out of this Agreement, 
or in connection with the transactions contemplated 
hereby, shall lie in any federal or state court sitting 
in Defendant's state, with proper jurisdiction over the 
subject-matter thereof. Therefore, if [plaintiff] were 
to commence an action against [defendant], jurisdiction 
would be in California; if [defendant] were to file an 
action against [plaintiff], jurisdiction would be in 
Utah. 
(Record at 54.) 
This clause neither asserts that it is establishing the "sole 
and exclusive" venue, nor that it is "ousting the Utah courts of 
venue" should Lundahl Instruments, Inc. sue Safety Technology, 
Inc. And certainly a minimal requirement for denying the Utah 
courts an opportunity to adjudicate a dispute involving 
performance of a contract in Utah should be that such 
disenfranchisement be explicitc 
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Examples of mandatory forum-selection clauses can be found in 
the three decisions by the United States Supreme Court that were 
discussed supra. In Bremen, supra at 2 (emphasis added), the 
provision stated: 
Any dispute arising must be treated before the London 
Court of Justice. 
The clause in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., supra at 
24 (footnote 1) (emphasis added), declared: 
Dealer and Ricoh agree that any appropriate state or 
federal district court located in the Borough of 
Manhattan, New York City, New York, shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over any case or controversy arising under 
or in connection with this Agreement and shall be a 
proper forum in which to adjudicate such case or 
controversy. 
And the language in Carnival Cruise Lines, supra at 628 (emphasis 
added) read s 
It is agreed by and between the passenger and the 
Carrier that all disputes and matters whatsoever arising 
under, in connection with or incident to the Contract 
shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a Court 
located in the State of Florida, USA, to the exclusion 
of the courts of any other state or country. 
AND THE EQUITIES OF THIS CASE ARGUE FOR 
VENUE IN UTAH. 
The instant case is essentially simply a failure by the 
Defendant to pay for goods received pursuant to a Uniform 
Commercial Code Article 2 sales contract. 
Orders for the relevant goods were sent by Defendant to Utah 
where they were accepted. The goods were sent from Utah to 
California by common carrier. Invoices for the goods were sent 
from Utah. Defendant was to send payment for the goods to Utah. 
1? 
And the relevant docimentary evidence is located in Utah. (Record 
at 4 6 .) 
Substantial support for this view of the equities , 
furthermore, arises from Walker Bank & Trust Co. vc Walker, 631 
Pe2d 860 (Utah 1981), where the Utah Supreme Court found venue to 
be proper in Salt Lake County (as opposed to another Utah county) 
because the contract performance, iL^ e^ , payment on a credit card 
account, was due in Salt Lake County* 
IN FACT, THE UNDERLYING CONTRACT HAS 
BEEN TERMINATED. 
Additional justification for refusing to displace the 
statutory directive for venue with a contractual provision 
proceeds from the fact that the Master Licensing and Marketing 
Agreement was arguably terminated in February of 1991. (Record at 
33, 40, 41, and 45.) This Agreement was, furthermore, negotiated 
in Utah, as essentially was its termination. (Record at 45.) 
It would, indeed, seem peculiar to permit a Defendant to 
escape the scrutiny of the Utah judicial system through a 
provision in a defunct contract. The Defendant in the instant 
case should be treated in the same manner as any customer who has 
failed to pay his bill. And the instant Motion To Dismiss should, 
therefore, be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, therefore, respectfully requests that this Court 
rule that the instant forum-selection clause doe snot preclude 
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venue in First Judicial District of the State of Utah, in and for 
the County of Cache; reverse the decision by the Trial Court 
dismissing the instant action; and remand the instant action to 
the District Court for a trial on the merits. 
DATED this / g^ day of December, 1991. 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Thompson E. Fehr s« 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to Defendant's Attorney, David E. Hardy, of 
Allen Nelson Hardy & Evans, at 215 South State Street, Suite 900, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 
;<?4k day of December, 1991. 
Thompson E. Fehr 
wpd/tef/sti.bri 
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ADDENDUM 
for 
The Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, 
and Final Order 
David E. Hardy, Esq. (13 67) 
Charlotte K* Wightman, Esq. (5821) 
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8400 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
LUNDAHL INSTRUMENTS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SAFETY TECHNOLOGY, INC., 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND FINAL ORDER 
Civil No. 910000418 
Judge F. L. Gunnel1 
Defendant Safety Technology, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss having 
been properly submitted to this Court, and the Court having 
reviewed the pleadings and papers and arguments of counsel related 
thereto, as well as all other pleadings and papers on file, and 
having issued its Memorandum Decision dated August 19, 1991, the 
Court issues the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and final order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and at 
arms length negotiated and entered into a Master Licensing and 
Marketing Agreement (the "Contract") dated April 21, 1989. 
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2. The Contract contains a forum selection clause set forth 
in Section 8*12, which provides in relevant part as follows: 
Venue for any litigation arising out of this 
Agreement, or in connection with the 
transactions contemplated hereby, shall lie in 
any federal or state court sitting in 
Defendants state, with proper jurisdiction 
over the subject-matter thereof. Therefore, 
if [plaintiff] were to commence an action 
against [defendant], jurisdiction would be in 
California; if [defendant] were to file an 
action against [plaintiff], jurisdiction would 
be in Utah. 
3. The Contract's forum selection clause is clear and 
unambiguous. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-4 (1951) provides as follows: 
When the defendant has contracted in writing 
to perform an obligation in a particular 
county of the state and resides in another 
county, an action on such contract obligation 
may be commenced and tried in the county where 
such obligation is to be performed or in which 
the defendant resides. 
2. As set forth in the Contract's forum selection clause, 
plaintiff and defendant expressly elected prior to this litigation 
a venue that is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-4. 
3. The Contract's forum selection clause is valid and 
enforceable. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, and consistent with the Courtfs Memorandum Decision dated 
August 19, 1991, and for good cause appearing, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Dismiss be and 
is hereby granted and plaintifffs Complaint, and all claims alleged 
therein, are hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this $Q day of September, 1991 • 
BY THE COURT: 
F. L. Gunnel1 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /JT day of September, 1991, a 
true and accurate copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL ORDER was served by first-class mail, 
postage prepaid, upon: 
Brad H. Bearnson, Esq. 
OLSEN & HOGGAN, P.C. 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
^^.,^^^C 
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